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This paper presents the rst topological analysis of Danish money market ows. We
analyze the structure of two networks with di¤erent types of transactions. The rst net-
work is the money market network, which is driven by banksbehaviour on the interbank
market, the second is the network of customer driven transactions, which is driven by
banks customers transactions demand. We show that the structure of these networks
di¤er.
This paper adds to the new and growing literature on network topological analysis of
payment systems.
Key Words: Network, Topology, Payment System, Money Market.
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent nancial turmoil has highlighted the central role played by the in-
terbank money markets for the smooth functioning of the nancial system and
implementation of monetary policy. Liquidity evaporated from many parts of the
interbank money market and central banks have intervened in force and has de
facto replaced private intermediation with public intermediation.
Thus, understanding the inner workings of the money market is of paramount
importance in terms of analyzing and responding to nancial turmoil.
Theoretical contributions have discussed whether a complete nancial structure,
where all banks have cross-holdings on each other, or an incomplete structure, where
banks only keep the cross-holdings needed, is optimal for hindering contagion from
arising, cf. Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas and Parigi (1998) and Freixas et al.
(2000). Basically, this is a choice between liquidity saving (banks can keep smaller
liquidity reserves if they can raise liquidity via the interbank market) and contagion
risk (banks become fragile towards disturbances - in other banks or the network as
a whole - if they use the interbank market). In theoretical models, central banks
are assumed to make optimal interventions in the interbank market whereby they
1The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reect those of Danmarks Nationalbank,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
2Corresponding author.
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can hinder contagion from arising, cf. Freixas (2000). But the risk of contagion
e¤ects and central bankspossible actions depend crucially on the actual structures
on the interbank market.
The large-value payments system is in general the settlement platform for the
interbank money market. The lion share of the money market transactions are
settled on this platform. Therefore, disruptions in the large-value payment systems
can in and by themselves create dislocations in the money market. Moreover,
disruptions for a single bank can a¤ect all other banks in the network. Thus,
resiliency is crucial. Besides the size of interbank exposures on the money market,
the risk of contagion e¤ects also depends on the size of banks and these banks
locations in a network, cf. Lublóy (2006) and Upper and Worms (2004).
Network topology provides a frame work for analyzing the inner working of
interbank money ows. During the last couple of years, the physical theory of
networks has developed rapidly as it has been shown that many physical networks
have many characteristics in common. That is, payment systems have many things
in common with other physical networks like the internet or networks for electricity
or water supply. In recent years, a new and growing literature on the functioning of
payments systems has emerged using the network topological approach. This has
led to important new insights into the functioning of nancial networks in the US,
Japan, Austria and Hungary among others, cf. Soramäki et al. (2007), Inaoka et
al. (2004), Boss et. al. (2004), and Lublóy (2006).
Data from the transaction journal of the Danish large-value payment system
are used to analyze two economically di¤erent networks of interbank money ows.
The rst network consists of money market transactions, the second of all other
transactions. That is, the primary transactions in the payments network are banks
proprietary transactions and customer driven transactions. In contrast to this, the
money market network consists of overnight money market loans.
We nd that the structure of these networks di¤er considerably. In the payments
network, two commercial banks are responsible for a rather large share of the total
activity, whereas there are several major banks in the money market. Both networks
are rather concentrated as 10 banks are responsible for most of the transactions in
both networks. Seasonal e¤ects are important for the size of the networks. The
payments network extends by the turn of the month and quarter and on the rst
business day following a holiday. In contrast to this, weekday e¤ects drive the
calendar e¤ects observed in the money market. Event studies of an operational
disruption do not indicate any troubles with regard to the workings of the large-
value payment system, whereas payments disruptions by a major participant change
the structure of the networks and the level of their activities.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and the
algorithm used for dividing the data into money market transactions and other
transactions. We analyze the network topologies of these economically di¤erent
networks, which are labelled money market network respectively payments network.
Illustrations of these networks are presented in section 3 and section 4 is devoted to
a components analysis of the active banks in each network on daily basis. In section
5, the summary statistics of topological measures for both networks are compared
and this lay the foundation for the analysis of seasonal e¤ects in section 6. In section
7 we analyze the permanency of links and nodes, which are of importance for the
stability of the networks. The nal part of the analysis in section 8 is devoted to
event studies of two recent incidents in the Danish large-value payment system.
Finally, section 9 concludes.
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2. THE DATA SET
We have access to all transactions originated over the Danish large-value pay-
ment system (Kronos) in 20063 . The system was open daily from 7.00 a.m. to 3.30
p.m. and 130 banks, including the central bank, were members of the system in
2006.
Banks use large value payment systems to settle obligations on behalf of their
customers as well as their own obligations arising from proprietary operations. An
important component of the latter is its overnight money market activities. We
use an algorithm similarly to Furne (1999) in order to separate out from the
transaction data set the deliveries and returns of overnight money market loans.
We refer to all other transactions as payments.
The algorithm denes a transaction as an overnight money market loan if there
is a transaction from bank A to bank B on day t and a reverse transaction from
B to A on the same amount plus interest on the following day. The details of the
algorithm are explained in the appendix.
A couple of caveats are appropriated as the algorithms selection criteria do not
select overnight money market transactions perfectly. First, the algorithm can only
capture overnight loans transferred via the payment system. Second, we can only
observe the settlement time of the transactions but not the actual point in time
where a bank enter into an agreement on an uncollateralized overnight loan with
another bank. An uncollateralized money market loan can be agreed upon earlier in
the day of settlement or on previous days4 . Third, the algorithm does not identify
term loans. However, this market is small in Denmark as more than 90 % of the
banks lending in the money market for deposits have maturity less than 7 days5 .
Fourth, the borrower and lender registered by the payment system may not be the
nal ones due to correspondent banking. Despite these drawbacks the algorithm
has been used on similar Danish data by Amundsen and Arnt (2005). Thus we will
adopt this algorithm and analyze the network topology for the money market on
the available data.
We identify two economically di¤erent networks by the algorithms division of
our data
1. money market network, which consists of overnight money market loans
2. payments network in which the settlement of customer driven transactions
and banksproprietary transactions take place6 .
The basic characteristics for the money market network and the payments net-
work are shown in table 1 along with results for the full data set.
3We exclude transfers to and from auxiliary systems such as the Continuous Linked Settlement
for FX trades, CLS, the Danish automated clearing house (Sumclearing) and the Danish central
securities depository (VP). The purpose, value and timing of these settlements di¤er fundamentally
from bank to bank transfers.
4Tomorrow-next and spot-next trades, which also imply pairs of transactions between two
banks on two consecutive days, are agreed upon 1 respectively 2 days before the settlements of
the trades.
5This is calculated from data on turnover and interest rates in the Danish market for un-
collateralized overnight money market lending. In 2006, 12 banks reported these data to the
Danish central bank. The central bank estimates an average tomorrow-next interest rate, which
is published daily to the market. See Damm and Pedersen (1997) for a detailed description.
6All transactions to/from the central bank are in this network since the central bank does not
engage in unsecured overnight lending.
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Table 1 Characteristics of the networks, totals for 2006
Transactions Money market Payments
Active banks 130 70 130
Volume of transactions (thousands) 602.7 28.2 574.6
Value of transactions (trillion DKK) 33.3 6.5 26.8
Mean value of transactions (million DKK) 55.3 230.7 46.7
Volume of transactions (per cent) 100.0 4.7 95.3
Value of transactions (per cent) 100.0 19.5 80.5
10 largest banksshare of
- Volume of transactions 87.3 53.7 88.9
- Value of transactions 91.1 83.0 93.1
Note: Transactions denotes the results for the full data set. Outgoing volume and value
from the banks are used to estimate the shares reported.
For each of the business days in 2006 we construct a money market network and
a payments network and we use these to obtain aggregated annual results. Each
network consists of a number of nodes and links. The banks are nodes and the
transactions form links between banks. Two banks are said to be linked if there is
at least one transaction between them. Links are directed and the direction follows
the ow of money, i.e. from lender to borrower and from payer to payee. If there
are more transactions via the same link, the transactions in a network are weighted.
The weights are the sum of either value or the number of transactions between two
banks.
Figure 1: Payments and money market networks
a: Payments b: Money market
Note: The top-10 banks (large and white coloured) are identied from total value of out-
going payments in 2006. Links are weighted by value.
3. ILLUSTRATION OF THE NETWORKS
The payments and money market networks for a single day in 2006 are illustrated
in gure 1. The links are undirected. The thickness of the links is scaled by the
value transferred across and the ten banks, which transferred the most money in
either network, are highlighted by larger white nodes. Three structural features
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are immediately obvious. First, more banks are active in the payments network
than in the money market network. Second, two large commercial banks play a
major role in both networks, but somewhat surprising the important bank-pair in
the payments network is di¤erent from the major bank-pair in the money market.
Third, the top-10 banks account for a signicant share of the turnover in terms of
values in both networks (83.0 respectively 93.1 per cent), which is quite natural
as large banks tend to be more connected than other banks. However the top-10
banksmarket share in terms of volume is 53.7 per cent in terms of the number
of loans in the money market network, cf. table 1. This reects that the average
loan size of the top-10 banks is substantially larger than for other banks in the
money market (the average loan size for top-10 banks is 356.6 million DKK and
84.5 million DKK for other banks).
Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the centre of the networks (measured in value)
a: Payments, one day b: Payments, one month
c: Money market, one day d: Money market, one month
Note: Data for total payments between the ten largest banks in March 2006 used for one-
month-gures. Since the weighting of links in each network depends on the total value
of transactions in each network, the thickness of the links is not comparable between
networks. The centre of each network consists of the 10 largest banks measured by the
total outgoing value of transactions. The top-10 banks are all commercial banks and bank
2-10 are the same in both networks, whereas bank 1 di¤er between the payments network
and the money market network.
In order to better understand the structure of ows among large banks we plot
the network of only the ten largest banks in gure 2. We do so in two ways. In the
rst column of gure 2 we show networks based on transactions for one day whereas
5
the second column show the networks based on transactions for an entire month.
The structural di¤erences between the payments and the money market networks
are striking. The one day centre of the payments network is almost complete7
whereas the degree of completeness is 20.0 per cent on average in the centre of the
one day money market.
4. COMPONENTS
Nodes in a network can be divided into groups depending on how they con-
nect to other nodes. A network is comprised by a set of disconnected components
within which nodes are linked by an undirected path and do not have links to
nodes outside the component. Many empirical investigations nd that one of the
disconnected components is several orders of magnitude larger than the other dis-
connected components, cf. Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2002), Albert and Barabási
(2002), Soramäki et al. (2007). In contrast, we nd that the payment and interbank
money market networks consist only of a single component on every day.
We divide the networks into four subcomponents8 , cf. table 2. First, we have
the core which consists of banks that are connected to each other via a directed
path. Attached to the core are two peripheral set of banks that are on a directed
path to or from the core. As such the core facilitates the circulation (or interme-
diation) of funds within the network whereas banks in the peripheral groups are
either senders or receivers of funds only. Finally, a limited number of banks belong
to so-called tendrils, which consists of nodes that are on a directed path to or from
the peripheral components.
Figure 3: A network and its components
7The degree of completeness is at its maximum of 100 per cent in a complete network and at its
minimum in a tree network, where the degree of completeness is equal to 1 divided by the number
of nodes. Complete and tree networks are stylized networks, which are not observed empirically.
See the appendix for an illustration of stylized networks.
8 In the network topology methodology the large component is known as the Giant Weakly
Connected Component. The core of the network is denoted the Giant Strongly Connected Com-
ponent and the lender/sender (borrower/receiver) only components as the Giant In-Component
(Giant Out-Component). Finally, the other disconnected components are denoted Disconnected
Components, cf. Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2002).
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Table 2: Components in the networks
Payments Money Market
Nodes connected by a directed path The core The core
Nodes on a directed path to core/tendril The sender only The lender only
Nodes on a directed path from core/tendril The receiver only The borrower only
Other nodes Tendril Tendril
Note: The lender/sender (borrower/receiver) only component can submit (receive) trans-
actions to (from) either the core of the network or to (from) a tendril.
Table 3: Components of the networks, 2006
Component Comp.s Mean Median Min Max Std Value Capital
shares Out In Average
Payments
Billion
Per cent Number of nodes Per cent DKK
Network 100.0 89.0 89.0 76.0 113.0 5.3 100.0 100.0 23.1
Core 67.7 60.3 60.0 48.0 86.0 6.2 99.6 99.6 33.2
Sender only 16.2 14.4 14.5 3.0 24.0 3.8 0.3 0.0 2.6
Receiver only 15.1 13.5 13.0 4.0 29.0 4.0 0.0 0.3 2.7
Tendrils 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 2.0
Money market
Billion
Per cent Number of nodes Per cent DKK
Network 100.0 43.6 44.0 32.0 53.0 4.1 100.0 100.0 42.3
Core 62.9 27.4 28.0 3.0 43.0 6.8 93.5 93.3 61.6
Lender only 16.9 7.4 6.0 0.0 24.0 5.1 5.5 0.7 11.0
Borrower only 16.9 7.4 6.0 0.0 27.0 4.9 0.7 5.7 10.9
Tendrils 3.3 1.4 1.0 0.0 24.0 2.3 0.3 0.2 8.3
Note: The components shares (Comp.s shares) of the network are calculated from the
mean of the number of nodes. The shares of the value are calculated for in- respectively
outgoing payments and the last column contains the average level of capital for the banks
in each component. The large maximum value of tendrils in the money market occurs on
the rst business day in 2006.
Our results show that 89.05.3 (the mean plus/minus the standard deviation
across days) banks are active in the payments network on average in 2006. 60.36.2
banks belong to the core, cf. table 2. The money market network is smaller with
only 43.64.1 banks being active on an average day in 2006. The size of the core
in the money market was 27.46.8.
In both networks, most of the transactions are transferred within the core, cf.
table 3. As measured by capital9 , banks in the core are larger than banks in other
components in both networks. As a number of smaller banks are active in the
payments network only the average capital level of banks is larger in the money
market than in the payments network.
The lion share of value in both networks is transferred within their respective
cores. For the payments network the share is 99.6 per cent of the total value,
9Bankscapital is their productively employed capital, which comprises deposits, issued bonds,
subordinated capital contributions and equity capital. Banks productively employed capital is
used to determine the xed membership fee of the Danish large-value payment system.
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whereas in the money market network it is 93.5 per cent. Banks in the peripheral
groups comprise almost all of the remaining value in both networks.
5. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE NETWORK TOPOLOGIES
A detailed analysis of the structural di¤erences between the networks across
time is di¢ cult by visualization. Therefore, we consider a set of statistical measures
common in the network topological approach in this section10 . We will focus on
statistics of network activity in the core of the networks as the core plays a key role
in determining the activity and the well-functioning of a payment systems network
due to its intermediary role in distributing liquidity among banks in demand and
supply of it, cf. table 3.
5.1. Basic network properties
The turnover in the payments network11 is larger both in value and volume
than in the money market network, cf. table 4. Moreover, as mentioned above
the number of active banks within the core of the payments network is larger
than in the money market network. That is, the banks in the payments network
have more transactions with each other compared with the money market network.
The link weight is a measure, which take the value respectively the volume of the
transactions, which go via a certain link, into account. The link weight in value is
slightly lower in the money market network than in the payments network (322.7
million DKK respectively 374.7 million DKK on average), whereas the link weight
in volume is signicantly larger in the payments network than in the money market
network. This explains the di¤erence in the average size of a transaction in the two
networks in table 1.
Figure 2 showed that the centre of the networks for the top-10 banks for the
monthly averages were almost complete as the top-10 banks tend to form links with
almost all other top-10 banks. But when all links in the networks are considered, the
actual number of links formed is substantially smaller than the potential number of
links. This reects that banks in the periphery of a network tend to form fewer links
than the banks in the core. For both networks only 1 out of 10 possible links are
formed on a given day with a slightly lower connectivity in the payments network
(8.30.8 per cent) than in the money market network (11.25.8 per cent).
Another interesting measure is the reciprocity, which measures the share of links
between banks for which there is a link in the opposite direction. The reciprocity is
virtually the same in the two networks as 1 of out 4 links have transactions in both
directions. The reciprocity in the money market network is substantially larger
than in the Fed Funds Market, whereas the reciprocity in the payments network is
a bit larger than in Fedwire12 .
10A list of the topological measures including a short description of these can be found in the
appendix. See Hekmat (2006) for a thorough description of the physical concepts in network
topology.
11The summary statistics for the payments network are in line with the results for the trans-
actions network (the whole data set) since most of the observations in the transactions network
are the same as in the payments network. Statistical measures for the transactions network are
reported in table A2 in the appendix.
12Overnight loans between banks are borrowed or lend in the Market for Federal Funds (Fed
Funds Market) in the US. The Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) is a real-time gross settlement
system operated by the Federal Reserve System in the US.
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The time series pattern over the time period for the turnover in value and vol-
ume, the activity in nodes and links and the connectivity and reciprocity for both
networks are shown in gure 4. Some of these measures reveal seasonality especially
around quarter ends. We discuss seasonal e¤ects further in section 6.
Table 4: Summary statistics, payments and money market networks, 2006
Mean Median Min Max Std
Payments
Volume 2,162.4 2,127.0 1,493.0 3,434.0 283.8
Value 105.5 101.3 29.5 186.9 27.3
Nodes 60.3 60.0 48.0 86.0 6.2
Links 282.6 277.0 202.0 489.0 40.9
Connectivity, per cent 8.3 8.2 6.7 11.2 0.8
Reciprocity, per cent 22.8 22.8 18.0 27.3 1.8
Clustering 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.1
Average path length 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.7 0.1
Average node degree, k 4.8 4.7 4.0 6.4 0.4
Link weight, value 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1
Link weight, volume 7.7 7.7 5.0 10.1 0.8
Node strength, value 1.8 1.7 0.5 3.4 0.5
Node strength, volume 36.7 36.3 24.1 54.6 4.3
Money market
Volume 86.4 88.0 4.0 144.0 26.0
Value 22.9 22.1 0.3 45.2 8.1
Nodes 27.4 28.0 3.0 43.0 6.8
Links 75.0 76.0 4.0 132.0 23.3
Connectivity, per cent 11.2 10.2 6.7 66.7 5.8
Reciprocity, per cent 26.2 26.4 10.0 50.0 5.5
Clustering 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1
Average path length 2.9 2.9 1.3 4.6 0.4
Average node degree, k 2.7 2.7 1.3 3.5 0.3
Link weight, value 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.1
Link weight, volume 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.8 0.1
Node strength, value 0.9 0.8 0.1 2.0 0.3
Node strength, volume 3.1 3.1 1.3 4.3 0.4
Note: The value and the link weight and node strength in value are in billion DKK. Clus-
tering and the average path length are estimated using outgoing payments from a node.
The reported summary statistics refer to the average of the daily observations for the core.
The reciprocity in the Fed Funds Market is 6.5 per cent in Bech and Atalay (2008), whereas
the reciprocity in Fedwire is 21.5 per cent in Soramäki et al. (2007).
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Figure 4: Activity of the payments and money market networks, 2006
a: Volume b: Value
c: Nodes d: Links
e: Connectivity f: Reciprocity
Note: All gures are for the core in 2006 and the months are labeled with numbers from
1 to 12. The value of payments (panel b) is in billion DKK. All gures include quarterly
averages of the variables. Even though the value is downward sloping and the volume
increases during the year in the payments network, the average value of a payment has
been almost unchanged in the period 2003-2007.
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5.2. Correlations of basic network properties
The di¤erent basic network statistics are not independent of each other. For
example a larger network might imply more links. Hence we look at the correlation
over time between the di¤erent network characteristics.
The number of banks active is positively correlated with the number of inter-
actions (links) in both networks. Moreover, more activity in terms of value and
volume generate more links and nodes in the networks. Furthermore, the value
and volume of the networks are positively correlated. This reects the patterns in
gure 4, where the activity in volume and value tend to covariate with the size of
the networks (nodes and links).
The connectivity in the money market is negatively related to any measure of
activity (value and volume) and size (nodes and links). In general, the denseness
of the money market network (reciprocity) is uncorrelated with any other measure
with the possible exception of the slightly positive correlation between reciprocity
and connectivity. This reects that a bank, which become active in the money
market, tend to have only a few links to other banks.
In the payments network, connectivity is negatively correlated with the number
of active banks and slightly negatively correlated with the number of links, whereas
the connectivity is virtually uncorrelated with the activity in the payments net-
work. The reciprocity is negatively correlated with the number of active banks
and positively correlated with the connectivity, but almost uncorrelated with the
remaining variables. That is, the payments network does not become denser as the
activity increases. This result is contrary to Soramäki et al. (2007), which nd
that the correlation between nodes (links) and connectivity are quite strong and
positive in Fedwire.
Table 5: Correlations of basic network properties, 2006
Payments
Value Volume Nodes Links Connectivity Reciprocity
Value 0.58 0.25 0.44 0.14 0.26
Volume 0.50 0.68 -0.02 0.09
Nodes 0.86 -0.72 -0.36
Links -0.28 -0.17
Connectivity 0.48
Reciprocity
Money market
Value Volume Nodes Links Connectivity Reciprocity
Value 0.62 0.49 0.55 -0.34 0.04
Volume 0.92 0.98 -0.57 0.09
Nodes 0.95 -0.69 0.05
Links -0.57 0.07
Connectivity 0.25
Reciprocity
5.3. Degree distribution
An important characteristic of a node in a network is the number of links, which
originate from a node and the number of links terminating in a node. The average
node degree is equal to the number of links divided by the number of active banks.
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In the payments network, the average node degree is 4.80.4, which is almost double
the average node degree of 2.70.3 in the money market network. In the payments
network, the maximum number of links originating from (terminating in) an active
bank is 29.03.9 (34.64.4), cf. table A1 in the appendix. In the money market
network, the number of links originating from (terminating in) an active bank is
10.33.4 (10.33.6). That is, banks within the money market tend to have fewer
links to other banks than active banks in the payments network.
In both networks, most banks have only a few links that either originate from
(or terminate in) these banks. In other words, the distribution of in-degrees and
out-degrees are fat-tailed, cf. gure 5a. A number of studies have shown that
in- and out-degrees in large-value payment systems in the US, Japan and Austria
follow power-laws13 , cf. Inaoka et al. (2004), Soramäki et al. (2007) and Boss et
al. (2004). In a random network, the distributions of in- and out-degrees follow
a Poisson distribution, cf. Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2002) and Newman (2005).
Neither a power-law distribution, nor a Poisson distribution capture the distribu-
tion of the in- and out-degrees correctly in the Danish case, cf. gure 5b and 6. In
the payments network, the exponential distribution or the negative binomial distri-
bution capture the actual distributions of in- and out-degrees quite well, whereas
the exponential distribution is closest to the actual values of in- and out-degrees
for the money market network, cf. gure 6.
Figure 5: Distributions of out-degrees
a: Distribution of out-degrees b: Log-scale including power-law
Note: The y-axis is in log-scale in panel (b). The data are for the whole network of inter-
connected banks. Only out-degrees are shown here, but gures for in-degrees are similar.
13A power-law is a distribution for which there is a scale e¤ect, i.e. P (X = x)  x  .
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Figure 6: Distribution of in- and out-degrees
a: Payments b: Money market
Note: Both x- and y-axis are logarithmic. The data are for the whole network of inter-
connected banks. The leftwing tail of the Poisson distribution in panel (a) has been cut
o¤ to keep a clear picture. This choice is reasonable since the in- and out-degrees for the
payments network are clearly not Poisson distributed.
5.4. Distance measures
The average path length is the average number of links, which connects two
banks via the shortest possible path, i.e. the average path length measures across
how many links 1 DKK must pass to reach another bank. Our results show an
average path length of 2.50.1 in the payments network and 2.90.4 in the money
market, cf. table 4. The corresponding values for Fedwire and the Fed Funds
Market are 2.6 respectively 2.7, cf. Soramäki et al. (2007) and Bech and Atalay
(2008). The maximum distance between two banks (measured by the number of
links) is the diameter, which is 5.50.7 for payments network and 6.71.3 for the
money market network, cf. table A1 in the appendix. This is substantially smaller
than the diameter in Fedwire of 6.6 on average and the diameter in the Fed Funds
Market of 7.3, cf. Soramäki et al. (2007) and Bech and Atalay (2008).
More than half of the other banks in the payments network can be reached
within 2 nodes cf. table A1. Increasing the distance to 3 implies that 91.22.7
per cent of the nodes can be reached and by the distance 5 almost all banks are
reachable. In a study for the Fedwire, Soramäki et al. (2007, table 3) nds that
the mass distribution function reaches almost 100 percent within the distance 4.
The larger distance between banks in the money market implies that only 42.19.5
(71.610.0) per cent of the banks can be reached within a distance of 2 (3).
5.5. Clustering and centrality measures
Clustering measures the degree to which two banks, which are both linked up
with bank x, are also linked up with each other. In other words, in the payments
network there is a 50 per cent chance that two neighbours of a node are also linked
to each other whereas there is only a 1 out of 5 chance in the money market network.
In both networks, the clustering coe¢ cient is much higher than the connectivity so
neither of the networks is random14 .
14 In a random network, the clustering coe¢ cient is equal to the connectivity. A random network
is constructed by adding links at random to a given set of nodes. This is a stylized type of network,
which is unobserved in reality.
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An omnipresent question in network theory is the relative importance of di¤erent
nodes and links usually referred to as centrality. We have already discussed the
notion of degree above. The most connected bank on any given day in our sample
had 53 outgoing (55 incoming) links for the payments network and 21 outgoing (24
incoming) links for the money market network. Another way to measure importance
is node strength which measures the amount (or number) of payments or loans
processed by a participant. According to this measure the largest node across
all days processed outgoing payments worth 74.2 billion DKK in the payments
network and lend out loans worth 21.1 billion DKK in the money market network
on any given day. The largest (directed) link between any two banks in the two
networks transferred 58.8 billion DKK worth of payments and 12.2 billion DKK
worth of loans. In a relative sense the largest node and link in the payments network
accounted for 52.9 and 43.7 per cent, respectively, of the total value transferred on
any day. In the money market the equivalent market sharenumbers where 71.0
and 64.5 percent, respectively.
Another measure of centrality is betweenness, which is a measure of the number
of paths between other nodes that run through node i. The more paths node i
handles, the more central is this node in the network. The measure can also be ap-
plied for links to identify the most important links between banks. Results in table
A1 in the appendix show that the average betweenness for links is almost identical
in both networks (29.28.4 in the money market and 30.33.7 for the payments
network), whereas the betweenness for nodes in the money market network is 40
per cent lower than in the payments network, i.e. each node in the money market
handles fewer paths than banks in the payment network.
6. SEASONAL EFFECTS
To access the implications of seasonal e¤ects we regress 8 di¤erent topological
measures on a set of dummies for holidays, weekdays and liquidity provisions by
the Danish central bank in addition to the regular liquidity adjustments on Fridays.
Results are shown in table A3 and A4 in the appendix.
For the payments network, the e¤ects on the rst business day following Danish
or US holidays are signicant for links, value, volume and average node degree.
This network is extended at every turn of month and quarter both considering the
number of active banks, links, value, volume and average node degree. Moreover
the connectivity decreases signicantly by the turn of quarter. These e¤ects are
due to large quarterly interest and repayment on mortgage loans, which is the
prime source of funds in the Danish housing market, and monthly payments of
salaries, social benets and taxes etc., which initiate more transactions that usual.
The network is largest on Fridays (in nodes, links and value) and smaller by the
beginning of the week (in nodes, links, volume and average path length). Both
planned and unexpected liquidity adjustments increase the number of links and the
average node degree signicantly.
For the money market there are signicant weekday e¤ects for nodes, links and
volume, especially on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays, i.e. the demand for inter-
bank liquidity decreases on Friday, which is the rst days in the weekly liquidity
schedule. This a¤ects connectivity positively. The same pattern of a signicantly
decreasing number of nodes and links, less volume and increased connectivity is ob-
served by the turn of the month. Only the average node degree and the connectivity
are positively a¤ected by the turn of quarter. Unexpected liquidity adjustments in-
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crease the average node degree and decrease the average path length. In contrast
to this, there are no e¤ects from expected liquidity adjustments or from holidays.
7. PERMANENCY OF NODES AND LINKS
We nd that 99.2 per cent of the total value (30.8 per cent of the total volume)
is settled by the 40 nodes that are active on each business day in the payments
network. Between these nodes there were 26 permanent links, which accounted for
74.6 per cent of the value transferred (77.6 per cent of the volume). Most links
only exist for few business days. These occasional15 links only handle 0.02 per cent
of the value and 7.7 per cent of the volume in the payments network. Compared
with Hungary, a smaller fraction of the value is transferred via permanent links in
Denmark, cf. Lublóy (2006). One reason might be that the Hungarian large-value
payment system has larger banks as its members, whereas banks of di¤erent size
are members of the Danish RTGS-system.
In the money market there is no bank, which is active on all business days.
The most permanent link existed for 189 days out of 252 business days and this
link handled 19.2 per cent of the total turnover in the money market. The bulk of
occasional links is larger than in the payments network. 11.2 per cent of the value
(26.7 per cent of the volume) is transferred through occasional links in the money
market. 7 banks were active on all business days in 2006 and these handled 10 per
cent of the volume and 66.7 per cent of the value in the money market.
Thus in both networks, the frequency of links is skewed to the left and the
frequency of nodes16 is skewed to the right, cf. gure 7.
Figure 7: Frequency of links and nodes
a: Payments b: Money market
Note: The number of links is measured in per cent, whereas the value of nodes is measured
in per cent and accumulated. The (accumulated) share of links (nodes) is plotted against
the number of business days. The data are for the whole network of interconnected banks.
15We consider links existing for less than 26 days as occasional, i.e. these links exist on less
than 10 per cent of the business days.
16Corrected for the value handled by each node. This reects that a node, which handles very
valuable payments, is more important than a node, which handles less valuable transactions.
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8. EVENT STUDIES
In order to investigate how the networks respond to disturbances we consider
two case studies of operational events17 . The rst event is an intraday operational
disruption of the Danish large-value payment system; the second is payment dis-
ruptions by a major participant on multiple days.
8.1. Operational disruption of the system
On Thursday November 16th 2006 the Danish large-value payment system ex-
perienced an intraday operational failure, cf. Danmarks Nationalbank (2007). The
system opened as usual, but due to an unsuccessful software update the settlement
process stopped after the rst few minutes and the system remained down for more
than 6 hours. When the system came up again later that day, a large bulk of trans-
actions was settled immediately. As a consequence of this event, the Danish central
bank extended the closing of the system with 15 minutes but only two transactions
took place after the o¢ cial closing time at 3:30 p.m. Furthermore, the central bank
provided extra liquidity to the market by repurchases of certicates of deposit.
Figure 8: Operational disruption in the payments network
a: Normal day, 1:40 p.m. b: Nov 16th, 1:40 p.m.
c: Normal day, End of day d: Nov 16th, End of day
Note: The gures are weighted by value.
17Event studies are useful to analyze whether banks change behaviour and if this benets the
functioning of a network. Both the subprime crisis in 2007 and e¤ects from Sept. 11th, 2001
had substantial inuence on the network topology of the US nancial market, cf. Soramäki et al.
(2007) and Kroszner (2007). The Danish payments and money market networks were una¤ected
by the subprime crisis in a data set for the period July-September 2007. Pröpper et al. (2008)
reach the same conclusion in a similar study for credit markets in the Netherlands.
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The operational disturbance implied a di¤erent structure of the networks during
the day, cf. gure 8 and 9 and table 6. By the end of the day, almost all of the
topological measures were signicantly di¤erent from the 2006 average, cf. table
6. The activity and size of the payments network decreased signicantly. The
average path length had decreased signicantly by the end of the day, whereas the
connectivity and clustering of the payments network increased signicantly. That
is, the payments network became narrower.
In opposition to this, the activity in terms of volume and the size of the money
market increased although the average value of each money market loan had de-
creased signicantly by the end of the day. The connectivity of the money market
network decreased signicantly, whereas the average path length and average node
degree increased. Thus, although the actual number of links out of the potential
number of links decreased, the average number of links per active bank increased
in the money market. All in all, the money market became wider during this event.
Figure 9: Operational disruption in the money market network
a: Normal day, 1:40 p.m. b: Nov 16th, 1:40 p.m.
c: Normal day, End of day d: Nov 16th, End of day
Note: The gures are weighted by value.
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Table 6: E¤ects of an operational breakdown in the networks
2006 Condence limits Operational breakdown
Average Lower Upper End of day 1:40 p.m.
Payments
Volume 2,162.4 2,127.1 2,197.6 1,883.0 220.0
Value, billion DKK 105.5 102.2 108.9 80.6 6.7
Nodes 59.1 58.4 59.8 55.0 33.0
Links 282.6 277.5 287.7 260.0 70.0
Connectivity, per cent 8.3 8.2 8.4 8.8 6.6
Clustering 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.27
Average path length 2.48 2.47 2.49 2.46 1.75
Average node degree 4.77 4.73 4.81 4.73 2.12
Money market
Volume 86.4 83.2 89.7 103.0 19.0
Value, billion DKK 22.9 21.9 23.9 20.9 3.5
Nodes 27.4 26.6 28.3 29.0 15.0
Links 75.0 72.1 77.9 82.0 16.0
Connectivity, per cent 11.2 10.5 11.9 10.1 7.6
Clustering 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.08
Average path length 2.94 2.90 2.99 3.01 0.54
Average node degree 2.69 2.64 2.73 2.83 1.07
Note: Mean values of selected summary statistics for the core. Condence limits for the
95 % condence interval are used to determine the signicant variables, which are bold.
Clustering, average path length and average node degree are reported with 2 decimals.
The drop in payments network activity and boom in overnight money market
loans are in opposition to the seasonal e¤ects by the turn of the month, cf. table
A4.
Although the operational disruption of the system had a large impact on the
topologies of the payments and the money market networks, these e¤ects were
temporary. If the operational event had lasted longer, these e¤ects might have
been even more pronounced.
8.2. Payment disruption by a major participant
One of the largest commercial banks in Denmark, Danske Bank, was not able
to send payments in the large-value payment system on two successive days in
March 2003. This was caused by a major it-problem18 . The Danish central bank
supplied the banks with extra liquidity to overcome a potential lack of liquidity in
the markets as the payment disruption as the major participant was able to receive,
but could not send transactions to other banks.
The e¤ects on the networksstructures were most pronounced on the rst day of
the crisis, Wednesday March 12th. The activity and size of the payments network
decreased, whereas the activity in terms of volume and the size of the money market
network increased by around 50 per cent on this day although the average size of
an overnight money market loan decreased cf. table 7. Connectivity and clustering
increased signicantly in the payments network, whereas the average path length
and the average node degree decreased. In the money market, the e¤ects on these
four variables were opposite.
18For a description of this event and how it was handled see Berlingske (2003a, 2003b).
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Table 7: E¤ects of payment disruptions by a major participant
Average Condence limits
March 2003 Lower Upper March 12 March 13
Payments
Volume 2,306.5 2,267.4 2,345.6 1,505.0 1,625.0
Value, billion DKK 145.8 142.1 149.5 119.7 128.6
Nodes 56.5 55.9 57.2 49.0 58.0
Links 281.2 275.8 286.5 227.0 254.0
Connectivity, per cent 9.0 8.9 9.1 9.7 7.7
Clustering 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.58 0.43
Average path length 2.46 2.45 2.47 2.44 2.57
Average node degree 4.95 4.91 4.99 4.63 4.38
Money market
Volume 64.4 61.3 67.5 92.0 46.0
Value, billion DKK 18.7 17.8 19.6 8.8 7.8
Nodes 24.1 23.0 25.1 37.0 19.0
Links 56.9 54.2 59.7 87.0 44.0
Connectivity, per cent 12.8 11.7 13.9 6.5 12.9
Clustering 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.17
Average path length 3.03 2.97 3.09 3.70 2.96
Average node degree 2.24 2.19 2.28 2.35 2.32
Note: The note to table 6 also applies here. The average of March 2003 excludes data
from March 12th and March 13th.
On the second day of this event, the major participant informed the public
about the it-problem and its implications for the banks business. Together with
the signicant boom in activity and size of the money market of the rst day of the
crisis, this lead to a decrease in activity and size of the money market network on
the second day of the crisis. This decreased the average path length and average
node degree.
The activity and the size in terms of links of the payments network remained
signicantly lower than the average for March 2003, but more banks became active
in the payments network on the second day of the crisis. This is reected in the
signicant drop in connectivity, clustering and average node degree. The average
path length increased, i.e. transactions had to pass less links to reach the nal
recipient of a transaction.
The disruptions by a major participant also caused an accumulated settlement
demand in the payments network and this lead to a sharp increase in the value
settled within this network on the rst normal business day after the event, cf.
gure 10.
Compared with the operational breakdown, the e¤ects of payment disruptions
by a major participant are larger in both networks. The structural changes in
the networkstopologies were temporary. And it seems as if the other banks took
precautionary actions towards the disturbance and continued settlements as far as
possible in both networks.
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Figure 10: Large bank payment disruption
a: Payments b: Money market
Note: Amounts settled in the networks during the day on selected dates in March 2003.
March 11th (March 14th) was the last (rst) business day before (after) the crisis, while
the crisis had e¤ect on March 12th and 13th. The value of overnight loans in the money
market increase by coincidence on March 11 as there are no holiday e¤ects or e¤ects of
additional liquidity adjustments by the central bank this day. The opening time of the
large value payment system was 8.00 a.m.-3.30 p.m. until June 1st 2003.
9. CONCLUSION
The topological analysis shows that the structure of the Danish money market
is di¤erent from the structure of the payments network. This is a consequence of
the di¤erence in the nature of transactions in the networks. Transactions in the
money market network are driven by banksbehaviour whereas transactions in the
payments network arise from banksproprietary transactions as well as customer
driven transactions. In the payments network, two commercial banks are respon-
sible for a rather large share of the total activity, whereas the banks in the core of
the money market are of more equal size. Both networks are rather concentrated.
Our results show that the distribution of in- and out-degrees follow the expo-
nential or the negative binomial distributions in the payments network, while the
exponential distribution captures the distribution of in- and out-degrees quite well
in the money market. In other countries, in- and out-degrees follow power-law
distributions, but power-law distributions are clearly rejected in our data set.
We nd clear evidence of seasonal e¤ects for both networks. The results show
that the payments network becomes wider by the turn of the month and quarter
and on the rst business day following a holiday. In contrast to this, weekday e¤ects
drive the calendar e¤ects observed in the money market.
Event studies of an operational disruption imply a di¤erent structure of the
networks during the day. Although the structure of the networks is almost normal
by the end of the day, the daily activity of the payments network decreased consid-
erably. In contrast to this, the daily activity of the money market increased. The
topological e¤ects of this event are in line with the seasonal e¤ects by the turn of
the month but with the opposite signs. The e¤ects of the operational event were
temporary, but might have been more pronounced in case the operational event
had lasted longer than it did. The event study of payment disruptions by a major
participant decreases the level of activities in both networks; especially on the rst
day of the event. An accumulated settlement demand was build up in the payments
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network, which was released on the rst normal business day after the crisis leading
to a sharp increase in the value settled in the payments network.
It could be interesting to see if the payments network builds up in a di¤erent
way than the money market network during the day. At the moment a rather large
fraction of the settlements take place before noon both in the money market and
in the payments network, but the e¤ects of a di¤erent timing of settlements on the
structure of the networks is a question for further research.
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10. APPENDIX
10.1. More summary statistics
This section provides more summary statistics for the networks.
Table A1: More summary statistics, payments and money market networks, 2006
Mean Median Min Max Std
Payments
Distance measures
Diameter 5.5 5.0 4.0 8.0 0.7
MDF, M(2) 54.6 54.8 44.7 65.4 4.2
MDF, M(3) 91.2 91.4 83.2 97.8 2.7
MDF, M(4) 99.1 99.3 94.9 100.0 0.8
MDF, M(5) 99.9 100.0 96.9 100.0 0.3
Degree distribution
max kin 34.6 34.0 24.0 51.0 4.4
max kout 29.0 29.0 22.0 53.0 3.9
Centrality measures
Betweenness, links 30.3 30.3 20.7 38.4 3.7
Betweenness, nodes 86.0 85.8 61.9 125.4 10.5
Mean Median Min Max Std
Money market
Distance measures
Diameter 6.7 7.0 2.0 10.0 1.3
MDF, M(2) 42.1 40.6 26.6 100.0 9.5
MDF, M(3) 71.6 71.4 47.3 100.0 10.0
MDF, M(4) 89.7 91.0 61.6 100.0 7.3
MDF, M(5) 96.6 98.0 71.7 100.0 4.2
MDF, M(6) 98.9 99.9 82.0 100.0 2.3
MDF, M(7) 99.7 100.0 90.1 100.0 1.1
Degree distribution
max kin 10.3 10.0 2.0 24.0 3.6
max kout 10.3 10.0 2.0 21.0 3.4
Centrality measures
Betweenness, links 29.2 29.4 2.0 51.1 8.4
Betweenness, nodes 52.1 52.5 0.7 92.6 16.5
Note: The data reported refer to the core. The Mass Distribution Functions, MDF, are
estimated based on outgoing payments from a node. max kin(max kout) is the maximum
number of links ending in (starting from) a node.
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10.2. Summary statistics of transactions network
This section contains the network topological measures of the transactions net-
work, i.e. the network based on the full data set.
Table A2: Summary statistics, transactions network, 2006
Mean Median Min Max Std
Basic network properties
Volume 2,355.9 2,337.5 1,607.0 4,171.0 323.6
Value 131.7 128.9 46.9 224.8 30.8
Nodes 67.8 67.0 57.0 88.0 4.8
Links 373.7 368.0 283.0 713.0 48.4
Connectivity, per cent 8.3 8.2 6.9 10.1 0.7
Reciprocity, per cent 24.0 24.0 19.1 28.4 1.9
Clustering 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.0
Average path length 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 0.1
Average node degree, k 5.5 5.5 4.6 8.1 0.4
Link weight, value 0.4 0.4 0.1 3.4 0.5
Link weight, volume 6.3 6.3 4.3 8.8 0.6
Node strength, value 1.9 1.9 0.8 3.4 0.5
Node strength, volume 34.7 34.4 23.0 48.8 3.9
Distance measures
Diameter 5.1 5.0 4.0 8.0 0.6
MDF, M(2) 58.1 58.1 48.7 69.8 4.2
MDF, M(3) 94.3 94.4 87.1 98.8 2.1
MDF, M(4) 99.7 99.8 96.4 100.0 0.5
MDF, M(5) 100.0 100.0 98.1 100.0 0.1
Degree distribution
max kin 40.9 40.0 31.0 57.0 4.7
max kout 34.5 34.0 24.0 54.0 4.2
Centrality measures
Betweenness, links 29.4 29.0 22.5 38.0 3.2
Betweenness, nodes 93.9 93.5 74.3 121.0 9.1
Note: The notes to table 4 and table A1 also apply to this table.
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10.4. The Furne algorithm
The Furne algorithm is used to identify overnight money market loans in order
to split our data set into transactions stemming from two economically di¤erent
networks.
The algorithm denes a transaction as an overnight money market loan if 1) the
borrowed amount is at least 1 million DKK in integer numbers, 2) the borrowed
amount is repaid with interest the next business day and 3) the interest amount
is within an acceptable range, i = [iLow; iHigh]. The lower (upper) bound of this
interval is the minimum interest rates on unsecured overnight lending reported
by a panel of Danish banks minus (plus) 25 basis points. The acceptance range is
extended with 25 basis points since "interest rates charged are likely to vary across
transactions", cf. Furne (1999, p. 26). The acceptance range on Danish data is
smaller than the 50 basis points Furne (1999) uses on Fedwire transactions. But
broadening (decreasing) the acceptance range to 50 basis points (0 basis points)
on Danish data gives almost the same classication of unsecured overnight lending
by the algorithm.
10.5. Stylized networks
Two di¤erent extremes of stylized networks are illustrated in gure A2. In a
complete network, a bank has links to all other banks in the network such that
each bank submits and receives transactions to/from all other banks within the
network. In a tree network bank 1 submits transactions to bank 2 and 3, which
submits transactions to bank 4 and 5 respectively bank 6-7. Another type is random
networks, which is constructed by adding links at random to a given set of nodes.
Stylized networks are not observed empirically but they are useful as benchmarks
for analytical purposes.
Figure A1: Stylized networks
a: Complete network b: Tree network
10.6. Statistical measures used
The list below gives a short description of the statistical measures used above.
These measures are common in the network topological approach.
Average node degree, which is a measure of the average number of links per node.
Average Path Length. The average path length measures the average number of
links connecting two nodes in a network via the shortest possible path, i.e. this is
a measure of the number of links a transaction must pass to reach another bank in
the network. The average path length can be estimated using payments received
in or submitted from a node.
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Betweenness (for nodes or links). A centrality measure, which measuress the num-
ber of paths between other nodes that run through node i. The more paths that
go through node i, the more central is this node.
Clustering. Measures to which degree two banks, which is both linked up with bank
x, is also linked up with each other. The more links the banks, which bank x has
linked up to, have, the more banks does bank x have access to. Clustering varies
between 0 (tree network) and 1 (complete network). In a random network, i.e.
where the links between banks are distributed randomly, the clustering coe¢ cient
is equal to the connectivity of the network. Clustering can be estimated both using
the payments send to a node and payments submitted from a node.
Connectivity. The share of actual links out of potential links (per cent). The con-
nectivity varies between 1nodes (tree network) and 1 (complete network).
Diameter. The maximum distance between two nodes in a network.
Link weight. This is a measure of the importance of the links, when the links are
corrected for how many transactions (or value of transactions) they handle. That
is, a link, which handles 10 transactions, is more important than a link, which
handles 1 transaction and vice versa for links weighted by values transferred.
MDF(x), Mass Distribution Function, where x is the distance from a node. That
is, MDF(2) says how large a share of all the nodes in the network, which can be
reached within the distance 2 from a node. The mass distribution function can be
estimated using in- or outgoing payments to/from the nodes in a network.
Maximum in-degree of a node (max k in). This is a measure of the maximum num-
ber of links that terminate in a node.
Maximum out-degree of a node (max kout). This is a measure of the maximum
number of links that originates from a node.
Node strength. This is a measure of the importance of the nodes weighted by the
number (of value) of transactions through each node. That is, a node, which han-
dles 50 transactions, is more important than a node, which handles 10 transactions
and vice versa for nodes weighted by values handled.
Reciprocity. Reciprocity measures the share of links for which there is a link in
the opposite direction (per cent). Varies between 0 (tree network) and 1 (complete
network).
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